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1 . INTRODUCTION
In static oligopoly models in which output is the strategic variable, it is
typically assumed that the firms' output choices are made at an instant in time.
This is equivalent to assuming either that production is instantaneous or that a
firm is committed to producing its entire chosen output. Furthermore, although
the order in which the firms make these decisions will usually have a large
impact on the outcome (compare the Cournot (1838) and Stackleberg (1934)
outcomes), the order is usually exogenously specified. This paper presents a
model in which production is time-consuming and where firms can modify their
production plans at various times during the production period. Although the
production of all firms is assumed to take place contemporaneously, one firm may
achieve a de facto first-mover advantage. In addition, "degrees" of first-mover
advantage emerge endogenously.
The model is essentially a Cournot model in structure with the exception
that the single output choice is replaced by a sequence of output choices. Thus
this is basically a one-period game with markets clearing only once. Only one
aspect of the dynamics of these markets is studied here, namely the time consumed
in production. The fact that markets clear only once provides the firms with a
commitment to sell everything they produce since unsold goods cannot be carried
to a later period. (An explicit multiperiod model with inventory is presented in
Saloner (1983)). This considerably simplifies the analysis and focuses attention
on the production decision.
The methodology adopted in this model corresponds closely to that developed
in Spence (1979) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1981') with two exceptions: (i) the
focus here is on production rather than investment, and (ii) the model presented
here employs a discrete-time formulation. In the spirit of those models we will
usually assume that the amount any firm can produce in a production "sub-period"
is bounded above. Consequently it is the relative production rates of the firms
that are important in determining the outcome.
In the case where the per-period production is unbounded, even though the
firms are competing in outputs and make their output choices simultaneously, and
even where all the output is in fact carried out in the first production sub-
period, any outcome on the outer envelope of the best-response functions between
the Stackelberg outcomes is sustainable as a Perfect Nash Equilibrium. This is
in contrast to the usual Cournot outcome.
In the continuous time limit of the discrete time model studied here there
is a unique perfect equilibrium path for production. This is in contrast to the
multiplicity of equilibria that arise in the Fudenberg and Tirole model. The
uniqueness derives from the finite time-horizon rather than the discrete-time
formulation. The infinite-horizon setting of the Fudenberg and Tirole model
admits implausible perfect equilibria in which each firm invests forever. Given
that a firm's opponent is investing, to continue to invest as well is an optimal
response. While equilibria of this kind are implausible and uninteresting in
themselves, since they are perfect equilibria they can be invoked as perfect
equilibrium strategies off-the-equilibrium-path in other equilibria, i.e. the
threat to invest forever if an opponent deviates from some specified strategy is
credible. These threats can thus be used to sustain other equilibria. The
finite-horizon employed here, in contrast, does not admit threats of that kind
and hence eliminates equilibria sustained by them. The result is a unique
equilibrium for each set of values of the firms' production rates.
We show that a firm with a relatively high rate of production has a degree
of first-mover advantage over its opponent. Indeed if the relative rates of
production become arbitrarily large, the firm with the higher production rate
gains an absolute first-mover advantage as in the Stackelberg model. On the
other hand, if the firms are symmetric both in costs and speed of production, the
Cournot outcome emerges. The outcome varies continuously as the relative
production rate varies between these extremes. Thus the degree of first-mover
advantage and hence the appropriate oligopoly solution are endogenously
determined and are quite simply related to the production capacities of the
firms.
The final result of the model is that unlike the standard static models, the
notion of the firm's "size" (as measured by its maximum production rate) takes on
some meaning. "Larger" firms in terms of production rates, ceteris paribus , also
account for larger shares of total output. Thus if two firms merge, since their
combined production rate is at least the sum of their individual production
rates, the merged firm will be larger in a meaningful sense. Consequently it is
quite simple to generate examples in which firms find it profitable to undertake
mergers that result in a decrease in aggregate consumer surplus. This is in
contrast to mergers in the Cournot model where a merger essentially results in
the disappearance of one of the merging firms.
2. THE MODEL WITH TIME-CONSUMING PRODUCTION
This paper is concerned with providing a means of characterizing a timing of
moves that neither endows one of the firms with an absolute first-mover advantage
in production (as does the Stackelberg model) nor robs both firms of any first-
mover advantage (as does the Cournot-Nash model). In order to focus on the
production timing issue, this paper analyzes a single-period model.
The model has the same basic structure as the standard static quantity-
setting models. There are two major differences. Firstly, the output and sales
decisions of the firms are made separately. * Secondly, production is assumed to
take time. Formally, the production period consists of T sub-periods with
production being allowed each sub-period. After the production period is over
the firms then make their decisions about how much to sell. Thus each firm
chooses a sequence {q. , q ,..., q , x } where q. is the output of firm i in sub-
period j and x is the amount put up for sale by firm i. The firms make each
sub-period choice simultaneously knowing the entire history of all firms' choices
to that stage.
We assume that there is some upper bound on the production rate, Q , for
each firm such that q _< Q Vi and s, and we assume constant returns to scale up
to Q . Our intention is not to impose capacity constraints but rather
differential rates of production. Accordingly we will assume that TQ is "large"
for all i. (if we define the Stackelberg outcome with Firm i as leader as S =
(S. , Sp), for our purposes capacity constraints will not be binding if
(T-1 )Q > S 1 for i=1 and 2). It is important to note that even in the special
case where Q is unbounded, so that both firms could produce their standard
cournot outcomes, as will be. apparent shortly, the Cournot outcome is not the
unique Perfect Nash Equilibrium in this model becasue of the separation of the
production and sales decisions. We will ignore the complicating factors of
inventory carrying costs and discounting during the production period, both in
order to focus on the speed of production and for simplicity.
The standard static best-response functions serve as useful benchmarks. We12 12
refer to these as R and R and we denote the outer envelope of R and R by R.
The equilibrium strategies will result in discrete-jump production paths moving
out from the origin in a northeasterly direction. We will refer to such a path
as a production growth path (PGP). We are interested in the properties of
-i t_1 • -1 -2
equilibrium PGP's. Let q. £ q (for t 1 ,T), i.e. (q,, q.) is the point
3=1
in output space that the PGP has reached at time t.
Several benchmark regions will prove useful in what follows. These are
illustrated in Figure 1 along with a typical PGP.
— FIGURE 1 —
Regions A,B, & C all lie within R. The borders of the regions are defined by the
Nash and Stackelberg points.
The equilibrium concept used is that of a pure strategy Perfect Nash
equilibrium. Equilibrium strategies will be denoted by superscripting variables
with a star. Where it is important to include the border of a region within that
region, the closure will be denoted by a bar.
Lemma 1
;
If any equilibrium PGP reaches region D, both firms cease
. _1* _2* -* i* .production (i.e. if q , q eD , q. = Vt > s,i=1,2).
Proof: Without loss of generality, suppose that region D is reached on sub-
-1* -2* -
period T-n. Consider sub-period T and suppose that (q„, , q_, ) eD. Since both
firms are on or beyond their best-response functions it is a dominant
i*
strategy for each to set q_ = 0. Now consider sub-period T-1 and suppose
/-1* -2*
that (q_, ., qT ,)eD. Regardless of the move made in sub-period T-1 at sub-
-1* -2*
period T we will have (q , q )eD. Therefore neither firm will produce in
sub-period T. Therefore the choices at time T-1 will not affect the choices
1 * 2*
at time T. But then again q,_ ., q^, .= are dominant strategies. Clearly
this reasoning extends to any sub-period from T-n on. Q.E.D.
1* 2*\
Lemma 2: No equilibrium PGP ends in the interior of region D (i.e. (q , q ) z
*FIGURE 1
interior of D for any 3).
Proof: Suppose that a PGP ends in the interior of region D. Let sub-period s be
the last sub-period in which there was a strictly positive output by either firm.
-1 -2
Then it must be the case that (q , q ) eD by Lemma 1 . But then at best one of
the folowing must have occured:
a) q^ < R
1
(q^) - q^ - for i or j, or (b) q£ > R
i
(q^) and q^ > 0.
Statement (a) merely says that at least one firm produced an output that took
it 'beyond' its best-response function. Statement (b) says that a firm
already 'beyond' its best-response function produced a positive output. In
case (a) this strategy is dominated by producing q
1
= R
1 (q^) - q
1
.
, and in
case (b) by setting q1= 0. Q.E.D.
The argument behind Lemma 1 is straightforward but it does display the
essential difference between the finite-horizon and infinite-horizon versions of
the model. In the infinite-horizon version there are perfect equilibrium paths
in which both firms produce as rapidly as possible, even beyond both of their
best-response functions. Not only does this mean that there can exist equilibria
with terminal points in region D, but 'early-stopping' equilibria in which the
firms stop production before the outer envelope of their best-response functions
is reached can also be sustained. In these early-stopping equilibria both firms
threaten to continue production into region D if both firms do not stop at the
target early-stopping point. Since there do exist perfect equilibria that have
paths into region D, these threats constitute credible off-the-equilibrium path
strategies and indeed are mutually self-enforcing. If one of the firms deviates
by producing beyond the target point, it will then be rational for it to
participate in its own 'punishment'. In the finite-horizon model, by contrast,
there are no equilibrium paths that lead into region D and hence threats to carry
production into that region are not credible. As Lemma 3 shows, a major
consequence of this is that the 'early-stopping' . equilibria disappear.
Lemma 3- Any equilibrium PGP ends in S (i.e. (qT + qT , q + q )eB).
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that there is an equilibrium PGP that ends in the
interior of A,B or C. Suppose firstly that it ends within the inner envelope of12 i* iE and R . Consider the last sub-period s for which q < Q for
s
at least one i. (One such sub-period exists since TQ 1 has been assumed to be
\ i*
sufficiently large.; This strategy for i is dominated by replacing q in its
sequence of moves by q^ = min {Q
1
, q^ + E* (qj + q£ ) - (q£ + q*).}.
(This simply says that player i can move the outcome in the direction of his
best-response function.)
Suppose then that the PGP ends in the interior of B or C. This means that
the PGP crosses exactly one player's best-response function. Without loss of
i*generality let this be player 1 . Consider the sub-period T. Eegardless of q_
,
2* 2it was a dominant strategy for player 2 to set qT = Q . Given that it was a
2* 2 1* /dominant strategy for player 2 to set qT = Q , player 1 must have set q_ = (for
otherwise a reduction by player 1 would have resulted in an outcome nearer his
-2*
reaction function along the locus q = q^ + Q ). Consider sub-period T-1 and
/-1* -2*\ ?* ?
suppose that (q , q ) e B or C. Then it must have been the case that qf; = Q .
By the argument for period T player 1 will set q' = if region B or C has been
1*
reached. But then for any choice of q_ . it is a dominant strategy for player 2
2* 2 ,-1* 1* -2* 2%
to choose qT_ 1
= Q since the outcome q 2
= (qT-1
+
<lT_i
+ °» 1T_i
+ 2Q ) is
preferable to the outcome q2
= (q^ + q^ + 0, q^ + q^ + qT > V q^ , qT <
9
Q . Extending this argument backwards in time yields the conclusion that the
1*
first step into region B or C and all succeeding steps must have had q =0 and
2* 2 1 * 2* 2
q = Q • Now consider the last sub-period s for which q * and/or q * Q
1*
(such a sub-period exists for if q, = Vt, the PGP could not cross firm 1 's
best-response
1* 1*
function). If q t then firm 1 could do better by reducing q and if
2* 2 2*
q < Q firm 2 could do better by increasing q
The final possibility to consider is that the equilibrium PGP ends on the
inner envelope of the best-response functions at a point other than N. Suppose
that there does exist such an equilibrium PGP and call the terminal point A as in
Figure 2.
— FIGURE 2 --
2* 2
Let sub-period s be the last sub-period for which q < Q . Let B =
(q + q , q + q ) and let K be the point B shifted vertically by e. At
2 2*
point B change player 2's strategy for the rest of the game to q = q + e,
2 2 2-1* -2*i
q = min {Q , R (q. ) - q, } Vt > s. Given this strategy of player 2, player
1 can guarantee the outcome given by C in the figure by producing a total of
1*
(L - q ) in the remaining periods. It remains to show that player 1 can do
no better than C for if this is the case point C will result from 2's
suggested deviation, an outcome that is strictly preferred by player 2.
Given player 2's suggested strategy, the outcome will lie on the locus HI J.
All the outcomes on HI with the exception of C are dominated by C itself.
Suppose then that player 1 can force an outcome on IJ that is preferred by
player 1 to C i.e. that lies on IJ to the southwest of D. Note however that
starting from B even by producing as rapidly as possible player 1 cannot
FIGURE 2
attain an output of E, before player 2 attains an output of E_. This
follows since if this was possible, adopting that strategy at B would have
resulted in a superior outcome for player 1. Also, starting from K, player 2
can attain a total output of exactly C_. Therefore when player 2 adopts the
suggested strategy and player 1 produces as rapidly as possible, the PGP lies
on a dotted line originating at K and passing between H(e) and G(s). Call
2
the point at which this dotted line intersects R , F. The closest to J along
2
R that F can lie results when this dotted line passes through G when e=0
when G(0)=G'. Note that this value of FJ is strictly less than E. by the
strict concavity of player 1's profit function. Thus facing player 2's
suggested strategy, the best outcome that player 1 can attain is F.' , strictly
less than E. . By choosing e>0 small enough, player 2 can ensure that F <
D.and hence that C is preferred by player 1 to F. Thus player 2's deviation
results in point C which with e>0 is strictly preferred by player 2 to the
original outcome A. Q.E.D.
Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, taken together, imply that any equilibrium PGP, if one
exists, must terminate on R. In fact an equilbrium does exist and in general
there will he a continuum of equilibria. However, in the limit, as the length of
each period goes to zero, we approach a unique equilibrium which is the analog of
the equilibrium in Spence's model ( 1 979 ) •
Denote the game described above by T. Now consider any subgame in which it
is possible for the firms to reach R in a single move or in which either of the
firms can attain its Stackelberg output in a single move. (if only one firm can
attain its Stackelberg output let it be Firm 1). Further suppose there are
sufficiently many sub-periods remaining for both firms to be able to reach their
own best-response functions. Denote such a subgame by r • Let the portion of R
1 2between S and S inclusive be denoted by F. Finally let the cumulative outputs
of the two firms at the start of this subgame be (a. , a ? ) and define
E = Ff:{[a 1t &1 + Q^ X [a 2 , a,, + Q,J}.
Proposition 1 ; If E is nonempty the elements of E are the Perfect Nash
1
Equilibria of T • If E is empty, the unique Perfect Nash Equilibrium is S .
Proof : If E is empty Firm i (w.l.o.g. let this be Firm 1) can attain its
Stackelberg output before is opponent can reach its own best-response function.
Label the sub-periods of T by s1 , s2, .... Let the output of Firm 1 in sk be
q . The following strategies constitute a Perfect Nash Equilibrium: Firm 1
2produces S. -a.
,
and Firm 2 produces Q in si. In later sub-periods, X, Firm 2
2 2 1
produces min {Q , R (a. + \ q )} i.e. Firm 2 attempts to produce its best-s 1
k=1
sk
response to Firm 1 's cumulative output at the end of the previous sub-period.
Since (1) any equilibrium must lie on R by Lemmas 1-3> (ii) Firm 1 can guarantee
the outcome S by following the suggested strategy, and (iii) S 'is Firm 1 's most
preferred point on R, S is the unique Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
Now suppose that E is nonempty. Let (b , b ? ) e E. The outcome (b., b )
lies on R. Without loss of generality suppose it lies on R . The following
strategies constitute a Perfect Nash Equilibrium: In sub-period s1 Firm 1
Produces b.,-a, and Firm 2 produces b ?-a„. In any later sub-period, X, Firm i
produces
i i *"
1
i
min (Q , R (a. + V <!>)}• These strategies result in the outcome (b, , b ) in
J k=1
SiC 1 d
equilibrium. Clearly no firm has an incentive to deviate. Given its opponent's
strategy, increasing output in the first sub-period of r results in an outcome
in the region D or on the portion of the outer envelope that borders region C
11
both of which are strictly worse than the outcome on the equilibrium path. If a
firm decreases its output in that' sub-period, its opponent produces a positive
amount the following sub-period. Since the strategies lead to an outcome that at
least reaches the outer envelope of the best-response functions the result is
strictly worse for the deviator. Since (b
1
, b? ) is on the outer envelope any
deviation in a sub-period after s1 makes both firms strictly worse off. This
establishes that any element of E is sustainable as the outcome of a Perfect Nash
Equilibrium. It remains to show that there are no equilibria that are not in E.
Let (b. , b«) be the element of E that is least preferred by Firm 1. Firm 1 can
guarantee at least this outcome by producing b. - a. in sub-period s1. Similarly
for Firm 2. Q.E.D.
1 2
Note that in the special case in which Q and Q are unbounded, any outcome
1 2
between S and S inclusive is sustainable as a Perfect Nash Equilibrium. Merely
adding multiple sub-periods of production to the standard static Cournot model
eliminates the uniqueness of the Cournot equilibrium and vastly enlarges the set
of possible equilibria, which then includes the Stackelberg outcomes!
Proposition 2 : The following strategies form Perfect Nash Equilibria for T: Let
rv be the subgame starting at time t. If IV satisfies the requirements of Tg ,
follow strategies in Proposition 1 . Otherwise set q^ = Q
1
regardless of the
history of play to date.
In T, firms produce as rapidly as possible until they reach a subgame
described by r • They then follow equilibrium strategies for that subgame. It
is easily verified that these are equilibrium strategies and a formal proof is
omitted. Notice that since T will in general have multiple equilibria, so will
T. Furthermore, the size of the set of equilibria will depend on how close to R
the point (a. , a„) is. In particular, as (a. , a^) * R the set of equilibria
approaches (a. , a„) as the unique equilibrium. This motivates the following:
12 12Proposition 3 : Let Q , Q *• holding Q /Q constant. Then there is a unique
equilibrium to P. If the PGP intersects F the equilibrium is the point of
intersection on F. Otherwise if R is crossed by the PGP before R , the unique
equilibrium outcome is S .
Proof : Consider the case where the PGP intersects F. Consider the equilibrium
strategies described in Proposition 2. Let (a..(Q..), a 2 (Q 2 )) be the starting
point of r • Let (a. , a,) be the point of intersection of the PGP and F when the
PGP and F when the PGP is continuous. As Q , Q + 0, {(a , a + Q ),
(a
2 ,
a
2
+ Q 2 )} *
{(a 1( a"2 )} and F/^{(a 1f a 1 + Q^),^, a2 + Q2^ * ^1 ' *2^'
This establishes that (a. , a2 ) is an equilibrium as Q. , Q2 * 0. As before, the
fact that (i) any equilibrium PGP ends on R, (ii) firm i can guarantee a terminal
output of at least a.
,
and (iii) the firms have strictly opposing preferences
along R, imply that (a. , a
? )
is the unique equilibrium. The argument for S is
similar. Q.E.D.
In the continuous time version of this model the relative rates of
production determine the unique outcome. If the production rate of one of the
firms is sufficiently large relative to its opponent, it will be able to achieve
its Stackelberg outcome and it will effectively have a first-mover advantage. As
the ratio Q 2 /Q]_ rises, the equilibrium outcome changes continuously from S
1 to
S2 . The Cournot-Nash outcome has no special significance and emerges only when
the relative rate of production of Firm 1 to Firm 2 is in the ratio N,/N 2 «
13
As was mentioned in the introduction, the fact that the outcome depends on
the relative rates of production means that the concept of 'size' takes on some
meaning here. Suppose that when two firms merge that the production rate of the
merged entity is the sum of the individual rates. In this case the new firm will
be 'larger' than the merging firms and may attain a more dominant position in the
industry.
As an example consider an industry of three firms where the rates of
production are in the ratio Q^-:Q 2 :Q 3 = 2:1:1. Let all the firms have constant
marginal costs (normalized to be zero) and suppose the industry inverse demand
function is P = 15-q, where q = q 1 +q 2 +q3 is the total industry output at the end
of the period. The outcome in this model has q, = 6, q„ = q 3 = 3> P = 3>
consumer surplus of 72 and profits of 18, 9 and 9 for Firms 1 , 2 and 3
respectively. Suppose now that Firms 2 and 3 merge to form Firm 0. In this case
the rates of production of Firms and 1 are equal. The equilibrium outcome has
qo = q-i = 5> P = 5, consumer surplus of 50 and profits of 25 for each firm.
Notice that Firm earns more than the sum of the pre-merger profits of Firms 2
and 3» Thus an incentive to merge exists and the merger leads to a decrease in
both consumer surplus and social welfare (as measured by the sum of consumer and
producer surplus).
In this example the merger both destroys Firm 1 's leadership and reduces the
competitiveness of the industry. It is the combination of both of these effects
that leads to the decrease in social welfare. To illustrate this, suppose
instead that Firms 1 and 2 merge to form a new Firm 0. In equilibrium qo = 9 and
q, = 3= Thus the output of the merged firms is merely the sum' of the pre-merger
firms' outputs. Accordingly prices and welfare are unchanged. The reason for
this is straightforward. In equilibrium Firm 3's output will be one-fourth of
the total, both pre- and post-merger. Thus from Firm 3's perspective the PGP
remains the same. Further, in both cases Firm 3 is a "follower". Thus the
equilibrium, which is at the intersection of the PGP and Firm 3's best-response
function, remains unaltered-.
Thus the example is not meant to illustrate that an incentive to undertake
welfare-reducing mergers always exists, but rather that a key ingredient to a
theory of mergers is a notion of firm size that is preserved (at least to some
degree) when mergers take place. In this model this is achieved by merging the
firms' production rates. More generally, merged firms should also be expected to
preserve existing customer relationships and brand loyalties.
3. CONCLUSION .
Traditional models of oligopoly usually do not embody any notion of firm
size. A result of this is the fact that firms that have equivalent cost
structures are placed in a symmetric position with respect to the shares of final
output that they command regardless of their capacities. Thus when two firms
merge the result is simply that one decision-making agent who was previously
active disappears. Therefore in a Cournot model with more than two symmetric
firms, a merger by any two firms results in a decrease in profits to the merging
firms. There are, however, a number of reasons why firm size may be important.
The reason explored in this paper relates to the relative speeds of production of
the competing firms in a model in which production is time-consuming. In such a
setting large firms, i.e., those with. high maximum production rates, are able to
gain a degree of first-mover advantage. Other reasons for the importance of firm
size include customer loyalties that are not entirely lost when firms merge and
the reputations that the firms' products themselves enjoy. Any of these factors
will be sufficient for profitable mergers that are socially detrimental to be
possible.
It is not unusual for the equilibria in games with finite time horizons to
differ from those in their infinite-horizon counterparts. This has been shown to
15
be the case here and the factors leading to the difference have been identified.
However the reduction of the multiplicity of equilibria to the unique equilibrium
found here as the continuous time limit of the discrete finite game is only of
interest if one is prepared to rule out the perfect equilibrium strategies that
give rise to the rautiplicity or if the finite time-horizon intrinsically has more
appeal. In product markets where there are frequent model changes, either by the
firms' choice or due to obsolescence, the appropriate model has a finite time-
horizon and thus also a unique equilibrium.
Finally, the model presented here provides a means of endogenizing the
degree of first-mover advantage a firm possesses in a quantity-setting oligopoly
model. A firm's degree of leadership or followership is linked here to its
production capacity. This raises a number of issues for entry deterrence and
strategic choice of capacity that have not been addressed here.
Notes
1. This follows the methodology used in Saloner (1983)*
2. This assumption follows the Fudenberg and Tirole (1981) model.
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